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Abstract
When analyzed in the context of the first Political Consultative Conference (PCC), a series of multiparty
negotiations held in January of 1946, the theory of third party incompetence begins to break down. A
more in-depth analysis of the Chinese third force reveals that their liberal philosophies were backed up
with practical plans, and primary source documents from the PCC reveal that Chinese liberals in fact
possessed a detailed and comprehensive strategy for China’s future.
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The Politics of Opposition:
China’s Moderates at the Political Consultative Conference of 1946
Ryan M. Winter
By the end of 1946, US special representative to China General George
Marshall proclaimed his mission a failure and returned home. The tension
between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists had escalated so tremendously
that Marshall no longer felt he could be of service in negotiating a peaceful
compromise. In his concluding remarks on the mission, Marshall placed his final
hope in the “third way,” the diverse group of Chinese moderates and nonpartisans
who he felt could be the “salvation of the situation.”1 A government that included
this “splendid group of men” was, in Marshall’s opinion, the last chance for peace
and democracy in China. Those who have studied the Marshall mission may find
this last-ditch effort baffling. After all, Marshall routinely criticized the third force
for lacking a focused and practical plan for the country’s future, and regarded
them as weak and unreliable.2 However, despite his misgivings, Marshall
understood that the Chinese liberals represented the best hope for compromise
between dictatorship and communism. Any democratic government would need
the approval of the third force to be seen as legitimate, and therefore their
approval was of paramount importance.3 Many historians have written off the
third force as an insignificant bunch of elitists. Suzanne Pepper, for instance,
dismissed them as “weak, disorganized, and powerless” at best; at worst, they
were “opportunists and pawns of the two major parties.”4 The third force has
often been perceived as possessing lofty democratic ideals but no practical
solutions, a shortcoming which contributed to the eventual failure of diplomacy in
China.5 Looking back, it is easy to find faults in the third force and proclaim their
failure as inevitable. However, when analyzed in the context of the first Political
Consultative Conference (PCC), a series of multiparty negotiations held in
January of 1946, the theory of third party incompetence begins to break down. A
more in-depth analysis of the Chinese third force reveals that their liberal
philosophies were backed up with practical plans, and primary source documents
from the PCC reveal that Chinese liberals in fact possessed a detailed and
comprehensive strategy for China’s future.
1

George C. Marshall, “Marshall’s Statement upon Leaving China,” in Larry I. Bland, ed., George
C. Marshall’s Mediation Mission to China, December 1945-January 1947 (Lexington: George C.
Marshall Foundation, 1998), 559.
2
Wang Chen-main, “Marshall’s Approaches to the Mediation Effort,” in Mediation Mission, 29.
3
Ibid., 38.
4
Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949, 2nd ed. (Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999).
5
For example, Roger B. Jeans, Roads Not Taken: The Struggle of Opposition Parties in
Twentieth-Century China (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1992).

70

Although mention of the PCC in English-language history texts is rare, the
third parties themselves have been discussed at great length in many accounts of
the civil war era.6 Roads Not Taken, compiled by Roger Jeans, gives valuable
insight into the history, philosophies, and goals of many of the liberal groups
which were together called the Democratic League (DL). However, it also
subscribes to the view that third parties were lackluster in their political plans, and
that they sidestepped difficult issues. For example, in his introduction Jeans
asked, “Did not the very minor nature of the little parties demonstrate clearly for
all to see the futility of opposition in twentieth-century China?”7 Despite clear
evidence from the Political Consultative Conference and throughout the civil war
era that the third force was anything but “minor,” other historians have adopted
this view. For example, Thomas D. Curran saw this so-called “futility” of the
third parties as stemming from a lack of “clarity about precisely how they
expected to accomplish their objectives. They seem to have consciously avoided
hardball politics, hoping to generate a ground swell of public support for their
cause but failing to formulate a concrete strategy for translating that support into
political action.”8 Historian Wang Chen-main has ridiculed liberals as “unrealistic
philosophers and old scholars,” and argued that “trying to build a democratic
castle on loose Chinese sand was one of the reasons for the demise of Marshall’s
mission.”9 Although they routinely discount the third force’s plans as unworkable,
few scholars have actually scrutinized what exactly these plans were. The Second
Political Consultative Conference presents a wonderful opportunity to assess the
charges against the liberal and moderate forces by examining the goals and
strategies, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the third force. Speeches
and opinions published by delegates to the PCC can be integrated with secondary
literature on the time period in order to evaluate the practicality of the third
force’s plans and strategies at one critical moment in time.
6
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At the end of 1945, as the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist Government
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rushed towards a final confrontation, it
appeared, for one brief moment, that peace would prevail. Most Chinese,
including the Communists, were even willing to continue under the leadership of
the corrupt and repressive KMT regime, as long as Chiang Kai-shek made a few
small concessions to opposition parties and granted constitutional freedoms.10 The
country had just emerged from fourteen years of brutal warfare—fifteen million
Chinese had died, and the Japanese army’s scorched earth policies had displaced
many more—and most Chinese were desperate to find peaceful alternatives to
civil war.11 From Kunming to Chengdu, massive student demonstrations
demanded coalition government and an end to the hostilities between the KMT
and CCP, but politics complicated the common desire for peace.12 As long as
Generalissimo Chiang enjoyed unconditional financial and military support from
the United States, he had no incentive to soften his position and make concessions
to the Communists. On the other hand, the CCP would never give in to Chiang’s
demands to relinquish the areas it had liberated.13 Due to public opinion, both
Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek felt compelled to advocate for peace, but their
terms were irreconcilable, and diplomatic talks in Chongqing had broken down.
The US government, too, had a vested interest in keeping China stable,
and for this reason it encouraged Chiang to include liberals and opposition parties
in his government. John Fairbank, US Director of Information Services in China
and a man intimately familiar with the country’s political culture, endorsed this
foreign policy.14 Fairbank observed a marked shift in the alignment of the middle
forces in the months leading up to the PCC. These liberals, who had previously
remained neutral but were constantly repressed and threatened by Chiang’s secret
police, were becoming disillusioned with the KMT. If they were not quickly
brought into coalition government, they might join the enemy and Chiang could
lose all vestiges of credibility.15 At the same time that Chiang was driving liberals
away, Mao was actively courting them.16 His program of New Democracy called
for many of the same reforms as the middle forces; the goal was to first transform
China into a democratic state, and then let the people decide which party should
lead. Mao was confident that given the chance, the vast majority of Chinese
10
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citizens would prefer his leadership to the corrupt and ineffective KMT’s.17 In this
way, the CCP hoped to draw in a large coalition of allies and then crush the
isolated KMT.
Due to steady pressure from the Communists, the US, and the Democratic
League, Chiang finally relented to holding a political conference in January of
1946, and invited the CCP, third parties, and independent political figures from
across the country.18 In order to achieve peace, the PCC was charged with
completely reorganizing the political and military framework to make space for a
new constitution and a democratic government. For the third parties, the most
pressing concern was military demobilization. As they saw it, if hostilities
between the CCP and KMT did not cease, the civil war would render all other
considerations meaningless.19 Equally important, but less immediate, was the
need to open up China’s one-party system to allow for a true democracy.
Recognizing that the outcome of the talks could literally mean life or death
for millions of their countrymen, all delegates treated the conference with respect
and civility. The Shanghai newspapers Sin Wen Pao and Ta Kung Pao both
described a pre-convention get-together of some of the delegates, held on January
7. Over tea, they talked for hours and reportedly behaved with utmost sincerity
and frankness, a feat “unprecedented to the political history of China.”20 The
delegates knew that the fate of their country, and perhaps the world, depended on
the outcome of the PCC. Speaking for the Democratic League at the conference’s
opening ceremony, Chairman Zhang Lan reflected, “As we attend this Political
Consultative Conference, we remember our responsibility to the people and the
debt owed to those who died during the eight-year War of Resistance. Our
victory, and this country’s independence, was won by the blood of these martyrs,
and we cannot let this success be in vain.”21
At the conference, the KMT was awarded eight seats, the CCP seven, and
the rest went, at least theoretically, to the middle forces.22 Nine were given to the
Democratic League and nine to nonpartisans and other independents. These
17
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numbers alone should indicate the power and legitimacy possessed by the middle
forces at the time of the PCC. Historians like Pepper and Curran, who argued that
the middle forces were insignificant or politically irrelevant, would struggle to
explain why the middle forces outnumbered the right and the left combined.
After weeks of difficult negotiations, the PCC ended successfully.
Although not every party was completely satisfied, its resolutions were
unanimously approved by the delegates, and China’s oppressive one-party system
had finally cracked. Even more promising, the draft of the new constitution
guaranteed all the basic rights and freedoms the liberals had requested.23
Celebrations broke out across the streets of Chongqing, and over all of China, as
hope for peace renewed. This atmosphere of jubilation, however, was short-lived,
and tainted by KMT crackdowns. Clearly, the ruling party had no intentions of
keeping its word or even protecting basic civil liberties. Chiang promised at the
conference’s opening that political rights and freedoms would now be extended to
all, but he did not follow through. Journalists reported that during the conference
itself, KMT secret police ransacked the lodgings of Democratic League (DL)
delegates, jeopardizing the trust and good-will of the meetings.24 When DL
members tried to hold peaceful public meetings to inform citizens of the PCC
proceedings, hired thugs threw rocks at speakers and violently broke up the
assemblies.25 Already marred by these instances of KMT insincerity, the PCC
resolutions completely dissolved over the following months, when reactionaries in
the KMT leadership flatly denied the legitimacy of the PCC’s reforms.26 Chiang’s
secret police continued to harass and even assassinate opposition party leaders,
and within months he convened a puppet National Assembly in violation of the
PCC agreements.27 Aggressively remobilizing—again in contrast to his promises
at the PCC—Chiang transported troops to the front lines with American
assistance. 28 The CCP responded in kind, and once war broke out, the middle
forces lacked the power to impose peace. Because of this spectacular failure, the
PCC has often been held up as an instance of the futility of the middle forces.
Examining the different groups that made up the DL and the strategies they
pursued at this conference can help uncover the reality of their influence and
political focus at the time.
23
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Zhang Lan, an esteemed scholar and outspoken critic of the KMT, acted as
chairman of the DL, and was accompanied by prominent civil rights activist Luo
Longji. Since the Democratic League represented an amalgam of China’s middle
forces, only two leaders specifically represented this party and the other seven
seats were filled by the various groups and associations enumerated below.
The Nationalist-Socialist Party (NSP), led by Zhang Dongsun and Zhang
Junmai, was allotted two seats. The conservative and elitist NSP favored Westernstyle democracy but also argued for socialization of key economic industries.29 To
overcome the inefficiency associated with Western democracy, it favored a
strong, democratically elected “moral dictatorship,” but with adequate protections
for individual rights.30 Although strongly anti-Marxist, the NSP was not totally
opposed to making concessions with the Communists if it would help avert civil
war. As long as the CCP stuck to its moderate demands of democracy and
coalition government, even the ultraconservative Zhang Junmai was willing to
negotiate.31
The National Salvation Association (NSA), also allotted two seats, was
not so much a party as a nationalist movement. During World War II, the NSA
had close ties with Sun Yat-sen’s widow, Song Qingling, who helped organize
student rallies against Japanese aggression. Its membership may have been small
and loosely organized, but its social influence was enormous.32 Hoping to create a
strong China independent of foreign imperialism, the NSA tried to patch up the
old united front between the CCP and KMT.33 As Zhang Shenfu explained, unity
and democracy were twin goals, and national strength would be secured through
democratic reform.34 At the conference the NSA was represented by Shen Junru
and Zhang Shenfu.
The Vocational Education Association, (VEA), held one seat, occupied by
its founder, Huang Yanpei. Huang’s vision was to democratize China through
educational and economic reform, with American industrial-arts schools as his
model.35 Huang’s relationship with the KMT was tenuous; at one time he had
been marked for execution and was forced to go into hiding, but later he acted as
Chiang’s trusted advisor and diplomat.36 He had recently been flown to CCP
headquarters in Yenan, and was very impressed by what he saw. He realized that
the CCP was not totally abolishing private property, and had actually achieved
29
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many of the reforms he himself sought.37 From that point on, Huang’s relations
with CCP became much friendlier.
One chair was given to Zhang Bojun, leader of the Provisional Action
Committee of the KMT, also known as the Third Party. As Van Slyke wrote,
“This party represented those members of the left-wing Kuomintang who had
neither gone over to the Communists nor been reintegrated into the main body of
the party after the split of 1927 at Wuhan.”38 Considered traitors and Communist
agitators by many in the KMT, in 1946 this group remained intensely opposed to
Chiang’s personal dictatorship, and had crowned itself the true inheritor of Sun
Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles and Three Great Policies.39
The final component of the DL was the Rural Reconstruction Association
(RRA), a small group that hoped to improve the quality of life in the countryside
through research and education.40 Only through reform and education, argued
party leader Liang Shuming, could China regain the ideal of Confucian harmony
and peace.41 The RRA argued for socialism and had close relations with the CCP,
but never could accept class conflict as a solution to China’s unique situation.42
This group was allotted one delegate, Liang, at the PCC.
The last faction to add its voice to the PCC was the non-partisans. These
men were chosen for their contributions to China’s social and intellectual culture.
Included were two representatives of China’s highly respected newspaper Ta
Kung Pao, as well as the esteemed educator Fu Sinian and the political scientist
and historian Wang Yunwu. Other scholars, teachers, innovators, and thinkers
brought the total number of independents to nine. It should also be noted that the
distinctions among these liberal groups was blurred, and sometimes even
overlapped with each other. Therefore, when reconstructing the third force’s plans
it is dangerous to use any one politician’s statements as representative of the
whole. Instead, party documents and platforms represent a more accurate method
of reconstructing the third party’s plans and beliefs.
37
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One such statement was delivered by Zhang Lan, chairman of the
Democratic League, at the opening ceremony of the PCC on January 10.
Delegates had cause to celebrate on this day: besides the successful start to the
conference, George Marshall had just finalized a ceasefire agreement between the
CCP and KMT, which many took as a good omen for the upcoming PCC. In his
opening speech, Zhang summarized the party’s “detailed plan” and readiness to
put political bickering aside to face the country’s pressing concerns. “To solve
these problems, we emphasize the following points: first, we cannot violate the
common will of the people; second, we cannot reject help from allies who have
good intentions; and third, when a solution is reached, we must follow it sincerely
and keep our promises.”43 However, as the third force knew all too well, good
faith at the talks alone was not enough to guarantee peace. The first problem in
any CCP-KMT settlement was overcoming the extreme level of suspicion and
hostility between the two parties. George Marshal noted that “the greatest obstacle
to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the
Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other.”44 If the third
force possessed no concrete solutions to overcome this impasse, then perhaps it is
correct to label them as a fuzzy focus party that advocated democracy but had no
idea how to make it work. However, numerous declarations circulated by third
parties during the PCC suggest just the opposite. In fact, if historical documents
attest to the presence of many practical suggestions to resolve the security
dilemma.
A statement by the China Democratic National Construction Association,
a group founded by Huang Yanpei in 1945 provides a perfect illustration.
Although this newly formed party held no seats at the PCC, its leader, Huang, was
present as a representative of the Vocational Education Association. US State
Department observers identified this new association as trustworthy and unbiased,
“one of the most respectable and honest” of all the liberal groups.45 The party
closely followed the PCC proceedings and concluded that tensions could be eased
by the release of political prisoners, dissolution of secret service forces, and the
use of nonpartisan inspectors to oversee bilateral demilitarization.46 Independent
overseers could “survey possible conflict zones and report back to the conference.
Then, if a conflict breaks out, we could allocate responsibility and it would be
easier to stop the confrontation.”47 Newspapers in Shanghai also reported on five
43
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suggestions presented by the Democratic League to ensure that the provisions of
the PCC would be carried out. Among them were allowing the talks to be open
and transparent so that no trickery or falsification could be employed later,
ordering all military leaders to submit to the PCC’s authority, and requesting the
creation of a committee to investigate infringements of the agreements, especially
human rights violations.48 As these documents show, peace was more than an
ideal for the liberals; it was a struggle, a formula designed to overcome clearlydefined obstacles. However, an argument could still be made that, while third
parties had a plan for peace, their democratic ideals were restricted to highsounding rhetoric, with no concrete plans, rendering them politically irrelevant.
This accusation, too, is not borne out when one evaluates the real
proposals and suggestions of the DL at the PCC. In actuality, the League’s
proposals would not only have led to a peaceable China; they were also based on
a solid and practicable understanding of how to run a modern, democratic
country. Documents from the Democratic National Construction Association at
the time of the PCC reveal no shortage in suggestions to implement democracy in
reality, not just in the abstract. The party advocated a federal structure like the
US, with more responsibility for local government, but also a national parliament
elected through “universal suffrage and a thorough reform of local autonomy.”49
As Gerry Groot, author of Managing Transitions, noted, the third force essentially
based its political model on the West, especially the US and Britain.50 While it is
true that the Democratic League relied heavily on the expertise of technocrats and
intellectuals to lead the masses to democracy, Luo Longji definitively clarified
that sovereignty was vested in ordinary citizens, and that these elites would be
dismissed if their actions contravened the will of the people.51
Many scholars protest that these parties were elitist, out of touch, and
therefore not truly democratic.52 Some Chinese liberals, such as Zhang Junmai,
believed that the people were not yet ready for its responsibilities; education and
economic reform had to come first, and democracy would inevitably follow.53
Yet, while all liberal leaders saw the necessity of educating the masses before
democracy could flower, their thinking was no more illiberal than the founding
fathers of the United States, and was in many ways much more progressive and
democratic. For example, the political program of the Democratic League
pronounced, “The nation will put into practice a system of general elections;
48
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voting rights for the people; the right to be elected with absolutely no limits
imposed by property ownership, education, belief, gender, or nationality.”54 The
Democratic League’s principles clearly went further than a basic understanding of
liberalism and democracy.
A related charge against the third party was that because it was so elitist, it
did not really represent the masses. Certainly, the men representing liberal forces
at the PCC were much more educated and cosmopolitan than the vast majority of
the country they served. It could be argued that this modern intelligentsia, so far
removed from the lifestyle of the peasant, was not a true representation of the
people. One humorous example of the skepticism Chinese third parties faced was
retold in newspapers covering the PCC. General Marshall, attempting to learn
more about the DL, had asked a certain Chinese friend how many people Luo
Longji’s opinion could represent. The man replied that Luo could not even
represent the opinion of his own wife, at which point “General Marshall laughed
on hearing such an answer.”55 Other sources have chronicled Marshall’s
frustration with third parties that exaggerated the number of members they could
represent.56 The assumption was that these parties stood for a few urban elites, but
in reality, the National Salvation Association and other democratic movements
were able to consistently mobilize far beyond their formal memberships, with tens
of thousands taking part in protests. In June of 1946, just five months after the
PCC, the middle forces were able to rally fifty thousand protestors against the
civil war. While the DL’s leaders may not have been a representative sample of
the Chinese public, it would be careless to brand them as out of touch.57
The Democratic League, diverse as it was, presented a unified economic
plan, which aimed to reform the inept one-party control of industry, which had led
to suffering for the workers.58 They called their proposal “national capitalism,”
signifying that it was based on a combination of private enterprise and centralized
state planning, and was intended to strengthen and serve the whole nation.59 Even
right-leaning Zhang Junmai believed that China was not ready for capitalism, and
called for state managed industry along with private capital.60 Finally, the DL’s
economic model contained land reform provisions to help struggling peasants; in
this way, the third force hoped to achieve a more equal society without the violent
54
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class struggle so blatantly endorsed by Mao.61 While this economic proposal was
strikingly similar to what the CCP recommended for China’s immediate future,
the Rural Reconstruction Association’s leader Liang clarified that it was an
alternative, and not a copy.62 In other words, his plan was to beat the Communists
at their own game.
The predominant, but mistaken, view on the Chinese middle forces is that
they represented a hopelessly overpowered, politically insignificant group of
elitists without a distinct plan to revitalize and save China. When Thomas Curran
stated that “Huang and others like him never really conceived of a third party that
could stand as an equal to the Nationalists and Communists,”63 he failed to realize
that Liang Shuming and many others in the third party had long thought of
themselves as strong enough and realistic enough to stand as an alternative to the
KMT and CCP. In fact, as historian Thomas Lutze has found, at the time of the
PCC, the Communists even thought of the third force this way.64 By assessing
party speeches, positions, and platforms at the PCC, it is clear that the prevailing
opinions about the middle force are misguided, and that they did indeed possess a
concrete plan which could have successfully revitalized China and brought peace
and democracy. As Zhang Junmai of the Democratic League recalled it, the PCC
was a victory for the third force. It saw many of its designs and proposal
implemented, only to be torn away by war.65 While it eventually turned out to be
powerless to force the war to a halt, the third force was far from the pathetic,
fuzzy focus parties described by Suzanne Pepper, Roger Jeans, and others. As
Lutze pointed out, “Such conclusions slighting the liberals appear to be the result
of historical hindsight, for at the time, these ‘democratic parties and personages’
were not so easily dismissed.”66 In fact, their vision was much more realistic than
the KMT’s, which was dedicated to one party-rule and intolerance of diversity.
The belligerent and undemocratic KMT, however, was the party that the US
continued to fund on a colossal scale, inadvertently undermining the third force
Marshall so dearly hoped would succeed, and with it, China’s hopes for peace.
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